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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG  
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: FREE FROM KHALIL IBRAHIM, JEM/CL OPTIMISTIC ON PACT WITH  
SLA/UNITY

REF: KHARTOUM 01889

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"Dictator" Is a Dead End  
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11. (SBU) Characterizing Khalil Ibrahim as a "dictator" unable and unwilling to lead his movement to productive peace negotiations, the Justice and Equality Movement/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) claims that its strength increases daily as Ibrahim's supporters realize his course is a dead-end. Six JEM/CL commanders in El Fasher told Poloff on December 3 that even Suleiman Jamous has broken ties with long-time political ally Ibrahim because of his short-sighted and megalomaniacal approach.

12. (SBU) With his military strength waning, "Dr. Khalil's friends in Khartoum will not even come and fight with him," said JEM/CL commander Abdulsalam Khitir, in a reference to Popular Congress Party (PCP) leader Hassan Al Turabi. In addition, the diaspora--which has been JEM's financial, organizational, and intellectual base--has recognized Ibrahim as a spent force, the commanders claimed. The critical "London Bureau" issued a statement in recent days backing JEM/CL leader Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda, Ibrahim's former Secretary General. They did not object to Ibrahim's inclusion in eventual negotiations but called him "irrelevant to peace."

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Field Consultations to Begin  
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13. (SBU) The UN/AU plan to airlift 44 JEM/CL representatives from Juba to field locations in Darfur on December 6, spokesman Tajedinne Niam told Poloff by phone on December 4. Abu Gharda, who is in N'djamena, and other JEM/CL partisans will join them. They will then launch the final round of field consultations with the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity to forge an alliance. JEM/CL has delivered a request to the UN and AU to facilitate transportation for representatives from key foreign governments, including the U.S., to observe the consultations. "We want this to be transparent," said Niam. "We don't want to hide anything, and we want you (the U.S.) to have a real chance to observe events and witness the unification process."

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Differing Accounts on SLA/Unity  
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14. (SBU) JEM/CL accounts differ, however, on SLA/Unity's internal cohesion and its effect on a possible alliance. The JEM/CL commanders in El Fasher reported that the experienced Jamous--who is at least 30 years senior to the majority of the rebel field

commanders--enjoys broad popularity among both SLA/Unity and JEM/CL while Abdullah Yehia and Sharif Harir--who control other elements within SLA/Unity--remain weak (reftel). (Note: Discussion with SLA/Unity representatives will be reported septel. End note.)

¶5. (SBU) By contrast, Niam said that while Jamous and Sharif had "different influences" on the field, Yehia "seemed to be holding the movement together." He predicted that "the whole" of SLA/Unity would unify with the United Resistance Front (URF) under a memorandum of understanding. "SLA/Unity will rule out an alliance with Khalil, so their only alternative is us," explained Niam. (Note: The URF is an umbrella group of rebel movements formed in Juba that consists of JEM/CL and several more minor factions. While it includes some Arab members, the JEM/CL commanders in El Fasher were firm that they are untrustworthy because "they go back and forth to the Government." End note.)

¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

FERNANDEZ